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Sequential Information Dissemination
and
Relative Market Efficiency
Abstract
Research in the area of capital market efficiency with respect to information
generally considers only the two conclusions that the market is efficient or
it is.not efficient; information is either instantaneously reflected in prices
or it is not. We investigate a market structure in which individual traders
may require differential time lags to respond to new information, either because of time lags in acquiring the information or because of differences in
ability to process received information quickly. In the context of this market, we argue that the dichotomous view of efficiency versus inefficiency is
not useful; rather it is meaningful to measure the relative efficiency of the
market. We develop a measure of relative market inefficiency and investigate
properties of the measure. Then we consider economic determinants of the degree of market inefficiency and review our measure of inefficiency against the
criteria proposed by Goldman and Sosin (1979).
1.

Introduction
An efficient 1 capital market is a market in which prices adjust 'quickly'

to ' fully reflect' all 'available' information.

This seems to be the general-

ly accepted interpretation of the pathbreaking work by Fama (1970).

Since

that time, financial economists have struggled to more clearly define the concept of efficiency.

The research efforts of those economists is justified by

the fact that the allocation of income and wealth in the financial market and,
indeed, the economic properties of the overall economy, are at least to some
ext.e nt affected by the information efficiency of capital markets. 2
This paper represents an effort to better understand the elusive concept
of market efficiency.

We consider a market structure in which information is

gradually diffused into the market.

With the exception of Goldman and Sosin

(1979), previous research in capital market efficiency has paid little at tention to the process by which information is disseminated into the market.
consider a market structure which allows for the gradual diffusion of new

We

2

data.

Our model permits us to explicitly consider the time dimension of the

price adjustment process, a factor ignored even by Goldman and Sosin.

Within

this framework, we argue that the traditional designation of a market as either efficient or inefficient is inadequate.
relative market efficiency.

We then develop a measure of

With this capability we can gauge the degree of

inefficiency.
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections.

Following this

brief introduction is a review of existing theoretical investigations into information efficiency.
of this prior work.
our analysis.

Included is a discussion of the perceived limitations
Section three describes the market structure employed in

In the fourth section we offer an intentionally traditional

definition of market efficiency which is consistent with gradual information
dissemination.

After positing this definition we demonstrate the problem as-

sociated with its application.
Subsequent to this traditional efficiency analysis, we introduce a measure of relative efficiency.

Section five defines the metric and examines

some of its characteristics.

In the sixth section we investigate the effects

of several important economic variables on our measure of inefficiency.

The

paper closes with a summary of our findings and points towards needed future
research.
2.

Previous Definitions of Market Efficiency
Much of the theoretical and empirical work on market efficiency in recent

years draws upon the framework exposited by Fama (1970).

In order to

operationalize the notion that prices "fully reflect" information, Fama posits
an expectations model to describe the market's use of information:

3

Thus Fama asserts that the price expected to prevail next period ( t+l) for asset j conditional on the information set this period ('t) is equal to one plus
the expected rate of return times the asset's current price.

Implicit in this

definition is that, whatever the return generating process, the information
set ' t is fully utilized in determining expected returns.

Fama's work implies

investors should not, on average, be able to earn excess profits by trading
on the information in ' t •
Fama also proposes a set of conditions sufficient to imply market efficiency.

These are:

(1) a frictionless market; (2) costless information which

is equally available to all market participants; and (3) homogenous beliefs.
Fama points out that these conditions are

~

necessary and a market may still

be efficient with 'some' violation of each condition.
In response to criticism of his earlier definition, Fama (1976a), (1976b)
offers an alternative interpretation of market efficiency.
step price formation process.

He suggests a two

On the basis of the information set used by

m
'the market' to set prices at time t, 't' 'the market' assesses a joint
m
probability distribution of security prices at time (t+l), fm(Pt+ll't), where

Pt+l
t+1. 3

=

(Pl,t+l,P2, t+l, ••• , Pn,t+l) is the vector of security prices at time
From this joint distribution and an assumed model of equilibrium re-

turns, the market determines current prices.

Market efficiency implies that
m

the market uses all relevant information in determining prices, ' t

= 't,

and

that the market assessed distribution equals the 'true' distribution,

fm(Pt+ll~~)

a

f(Pt+ll~t)•

Fama's work provides an intuitive description of the notion of information efficiency and the impetus ·for most of the empirical efficiency work.
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His definition of efficiency, however, has some conceptual difficulties.

Fama

offers no explanation of why the market might ignore some information in
m
determining prices, i.e., why ~t
~t·
In addition, the idea of a 'true'

*

distribution for security returns seems to imply the existence of an 'intrinsic value' for

~hat

security which is independent of the beliefs and prefer-

ences of the market participants.

Finally, Fama's efficiency definition re-

quires some assumption concerning an equilibrium return generating model.
Rubenstein (1975) and Beja (1976) propose action-oriented definitions of
market efficiency.

Rubinstein uses a three date (t=-0,1,2) Arrow-Debreu econo-

my to demonstrate his efficiency criterion.
with respect to two sets of information.
elation of the state of nature at t=-1.

He is interested in efficiency

New information is defined as a revThis revelation provides the traders

with additional insight concerning the t=2 state of the world.

Rubinstein's

definition of all data includes this new information plus the individual's
prior (time taO) subjective distribution of states.
An individual perceives

~

information as fully reflected in price if

and only if there is no portfolio revision at t=1. 4

The assumption of a com-

plete market removes any incentive for trading except for a revision of beliefs not fully offset by a change in price.

Any trading at the intermediate

date implies at least one investor does not believe prices fully reflect the
new information.
Other scholars have attempted to refine the concept of efficiency.

Huber

(1978) attributes the following definition to Sharpe:
Prices fully reflect the information set

~'

identical to the prices that would exist if

if prices are
~

was made public.

This definition (or some variant thereof) is one of the more frequently used
definitions in the literature.

Note the severity of its implications.

If

5

even a single investor in a large market discovers some information not generally known to the market, equilibrium price must react as if everyone possessed the same data.
The concept of efficiency may be viewed as either an ex post property of
a series of prices or an ex ante property of a pricing process.

If the pro-

fession is to empirically test the efficiency of financial markets any definition IIllSt be consistent with ex post efficiency.

It is equally important,

however, to be able to consider the ex ante efficiency of an equilibrium pricing process.

Huber (1978) noted the distinction.

He offers the following

definition:
A process determining equilibrium prices and allocations
is termed efficient with respect to an information structure if, for every possible set of signal outcomes from
the information structure, equilibrium prices and allocations are identical to those which would be determined if
the same set of signal outcomes had been generated by a
public information structure.
This definition is consistent with both ex ante and ex post notions of efficiency.
All of the studies reviewed thus far offer explicit definitions of an
efficient market.

The research examined in the remainder of this overview is

concerned with market settings which either do or do not achieve efficiency.
From this work are implications for the concept of information efficiency.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1975), (1976), are interested in the efficiency
properties of a market in which only a fraction of the market participants receive additional data and the uninfo~ed investors use market price to infer
what they can about the information set of the informed traders.

Grossman

6

and Stiglitz develop a market structure in which information is costless and
equilibrium price is a one-to-one correspondence with the information set of
the informed group of investors.

If, through repeated observations of the

(assumed) stationary return generating process, the uninformed learn this correspondence, they can use market price to infer the information set of their
better informed trading partners.s

In this case, since every investor has the

same information set, the market is efficient.
Now consider the same market structure except that the new information is
costly.

If an investor chooses to become informed the traders remaining

uninformed invert price and the market is efficient.

The fact that uninformed

individuals may 'free-ride' eliminates the incentive for any investor to pay
to become informed.

Howeve!, if no one receives the new data, market price

cannot be efficient.

Thus before a market participant has an incentive to

obtain the new information, he must expect to earn a fair return on his
information acquisition.

This implies that equilibrium prices cannot 'fully

reflect' all information.6
If we introduce an additional source of randomness (besides the new information) into this basic market structure, say random endowments, there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the informed investor's data set and
equilibrium price.
supply is low.

Price may be high because the news is favorable or because

The uninformed cannot discover the information set of the in-

formed agent with certainty.

In equilibrium a fraction of the market partici-

pants choose to become informed, and at the margin, the informed investor
earns a fair economic return on his investment in the information.
Figlewski (1978) is interested in investigating the mechanism by which
markets become efficient.
page 80] in mind.

He has the following scenario by Cootner [(1967),

7

Given the uncertainty of the real world the many actual
and virtual investors will have many, perhaps equally
If any group of investors was

many, price forecasts

consist.e ntly better than average at forecasting price,
they would accumulate wealth and give their forecasts
greater and greater weight.

In the process, they would

bring the present price closer to the 'true' value.

Con-

versely, investors who were worse than average in forecasting ability would carry less and less weight.

If this

process worked well enough, the present price would reflect the best information about the future in the sense
that the present price, plus normal profits, would be the
best estimate of future price.
In this view the market price is a weighted average of investors' beliefs
where the weights are directly related to the investor's wealth.

Assuming

some minimum regularity assumptions on demand curves, there is some distribution of wealth for which the wealth weights are identical to the forecasting
ability weights and each trader's information is correctly reflected in equilibrium price.

Figlewski finds that in the short run the actual distribution

of wealth tends towards this efficient market distribution.

Traders with in-

formation undervalued by price have expected gains while traders whose data is
overvalued can expect losses.

In the long run, however, random forecasting

errors prevent the market from achieving the efficient market wealth distribution. -, Thus the market is efficient with probability zero.
Figlewski is also interested in assessing the relative efficiency of his
market se tting under various assumptions a bout the characteristics of the
market participants.

Using the variance of current versus future market price

8

as his measure of inefficiency, Figlewski finds, through numerical analysis,
that traders who are more risk averse and more homogeneous in their ability to
gather and process information produce more efficient markets.
Goldman and Sosin (1979) partition the market participants into two
groups.

One group, denoted speculators, enjoys a priority of information re-

ceipt over the other group, the ' investors.

The first market setting Goldman

and Sosin (GS) examine is one in which there is no uncertainty regarding the
number of speculators or the amount of time which elapses before the investors
are informed.

They find that speculators may 'sit-on' the new data for some

period of time until it is profitable to act.

This type of behavior is cer-

tainly not in the best interests of market efficiency.
The primary focus of GS is the effect of the frequency of transacting on
market efficiency.

Their measure of inefficiency (MI) is the mean square er-

ror between the price that exists when just the speculators are informed and
the market price when everyone is informed.

GS investigate the conditions

under which their MI is minimized with continuous trading.

They find that, if

'sufficient' uncertainty surrounds the dissemination process, continuous trading is detrimental to market efficiency.
GS examine two types of dissemination uncertainty.

Type I uncertainty

(speed of dissemination uncertainty) is the length of time after the speculators receive the new data that the investors remain uninformed and type II uncertainty (path of dissemination uncertainty) is uncertainty concerning the
number of speculators.

With only type I uncertainty GS find their MI is

minimized when there is continuous trading.

The addition of a 'sufficient'

level of type II uncertainty implies the existence of a unique optimal time
interval between tatonnements which minimizes their MI.

Furthermore this op-

timal time interval decreases as the level of type II uncertainty decreases.

9

In summary, it seems that efficiency is typically defined in terms of the
equivalence of certain market characteristics under alternative information
settings.

In Fama (1976 a,b) it is the equivalence of the market assessed

distribution function and the 'true' distribution.

Rubinstein (with regard to

new information) and Beja define efficiency with regard to identical portfolio
positions.

The most popular definition involves the equivalency of prices.

Sharpe, Goldman and Sosin, Rubinstein, Figlewski, and Grossman and Stiglitz
all compare existing market price to 'the efficient market price.'

Finally,

Huber defines efficiency as the equivalence of both prices and portfolio positions.

With the exception of Goldman and Sosin, none of these studies explic-

itly consider the manner in which hew data is disseminated to the market participants.

In order to develop a definition of market efficiency in an en-

vironment consistent with gradual information dissemination, we introduce our
market structure in the following section.
3.

Market Structure
Imagine a world in which expected-utility-of-wealth maximizing individ-

uals are faced with three decisions affecting wealth.

They must choose a

level of consumption, select a quantity of information activities and allocate
their remaining funds among various investment opportunities.

Some of these

investment opportunities offer a stochastic return while others may be riskless.

Suppose, as in Verrecchia (1980), the more an individual spends on the

acquisition and processing of information, the more rapidly he can expect to
react to the release of new data. 7

The new data consists of an (assumed) ex-

ogenous signal which the investor views as being informative about the return(s) of some risky security(ies).

In such an economy the actions of in-

vestors naturally form a continuum along the information expenditure line.

- - - - --- -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Some traders invest (relatively) large amounts in information with the expectation of being able to react quickly, other individuals spend little and are
content with less of an informational advantage.

If investors' beliefs about

the economy are rational, their expectations about their position in the dissemination process must be fulfilled. 8
Thus individuals make irrevocable consumption and information related expenditure decisions for the current time period and trade to an equilibrium in
the financial security market prior to the release of additional information.
Each individual does, however, consider the anticipated implications of the
forthcoming information event when selecting his optimal consumption, information and investment decisions.
formation event occurs.

Subsequent to this initial equilibrium the in-

This event may consist of either a public signal

(everyone receives identical signals) or private signals.

Regardless of the

type of information investors receive, relative times are determined by the
equilibrating process in the market for information (described in the preceding paragraph).

The information market equilibrium implies investors react to

the information event sequentially until all are informed.9
In addition to the exogenous signal we assume each investor is capable of
using equilibrium price as a 'noisy' signal of the other investors' information sets.

This implies that as each investor receives and reacts to the ex-

ogenous signal, every investor infers as much as possible about that signal.
To avoid problems of informative overefficiency (see Grassman-Stiglitz
(1976)), we assume the existence of a second stochastic element in the economy
which prevents a one-to-one correspondence between the equilibrium price
changes and the exogenous signal.10
After each exogenous signal those investors gaining information, either
by directly observing the signal or making inferences about the signal from

11

price, alter their prior beliefs about the future value(s) of the risky asset(s) in question.

We do not specify the exact process by which investors

form their new beliefs.
Given the revised beliefs, individuals find their prior portfolio position to be suboptimal.

They use the financial security market to alter this

current investment allocation.

The actions of these investors create a new

equilibrium with a new market-clearing price based on the new set of beliefs.
This sequence of events is repeated as each investor becomes informed and
results in a series of temporary equilibria between the initial equilibrium
when no one is informed and the final equilibrium when all are informed.

The

process is illustrated below.
The financial market begins in equilibrium.
Step la:
lb:
lc:

The first trader receives the exogenous signal.
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade.
The market achieves equilibrium.

Step 2a:
2b:
2c:

The second trader receives the exogenous signal.
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade.
The market achieves equilibrium.

Step Na:
Nb:
Nc:

The Nth (last) trader receives the exogenous signal.
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade.
The market achieves equilibrium.

Each of the equilibria, with the exception of the last, is merely temporary.
These equilibria last only until the next investor becomes informed.
4.

Market efficiency with gradual information dissemination.
None of the efficiency concepts ment i oned earlier explicitly consi der the

information dissemination process (although most make the implicit assumption
that information is available simultaneously to all investors).

Our posited

market structure, on the other hand, considers this information diffusion process as the central concern.

Before we can address the issue of efficiency in

this more general market setting, we must define an efficiency concept which

12
is consistent with the sequential receipt of informtion by the market participants.

We offer such a definition below.

Our interpretation retains the

ex ante emphasis of Huber and is intentionally traditional in the sense that
it requires identical prices and allocations under alternative information
structures.
A process determining final equilibrium prices and final
allocations is efficient with respect to the information
structure if, for every possible set of signal outcomes
and for every possible sequence of signals received by the
investors, final equilibrium prices and final allocations
are identical to those prices and allocations which would
be determined by the same process if the entire sequence
of signals was received by each investor.
This definition suggests the following scenario.
nals and number them 1 through N.
N investors numbers, 1 to N.

Suppose we generate N sig-

Further, suppose we arbitrarily assign the

Assume investor i observes only signal i.

In an

efficient market the final prices and allocations must be independent of the
ordering of signals and individuals and identical to the prices and allocations which would exist if each investor observes all N signals.

In this def-

inition we require nothing of the intermediate prices generated by the (N-1)
temporary equilibria.

This is consistent with other traditional efficiency

concepts which are concerned only with the property of a stable equilibrium
price.
We posit this definition primarily as a 'strawman,' for the purpose of
demonstrating the inadequacy of a dichotomous, efficient/inefficient designation in a market characterized by gradual information dissemination.

Proper

13
consideration of this information diffusion process implies only very restrictive (and uninteresting) market settings achieve efficiency.

We address this

dilemma by proposing a measure of relative efficiency which is based on the
sequential receipt of new data by investors.
We demonstrate the restrictiveness of the conditions required to guarantee efficiency in our market setting by focusing on a two date (t = 0,1) pure
exchange economy with one risky and one riskfree asset.

Individuals (i=1, 2,

• • • , N) are assumed to maximize the expected utility of date 1 wealth by
selecting holdings of the riskless asset (bi) and the risky security (zi).
The quantity zi is investor i's fractional holding of the total fixed supply
of risky asset.
Each unit of the riskless security held is a claim to r units of time t=1
wealth.

The uncertain t=1 value of the total supply of the risky asset is X.

Individuals enter the economy with an endowment vector (bi, zi) which they
consider optimal given their prior beliefs.

The endowment vector, combined

with the normalized price vector (1,p), determines investor wealth,
(l)

*
* zi).
which acts as a constraint in the selection of an optimal portfolio (bi,
Each trader maximizes his expected utility of time t=l wealth,

(2)

subject to the budget constraint.

By substituting for bi from equation (1)

into equation (2), we may rewrite equation (2) as,
~

Yi = rWi + zi (X- rp),
where

(X -

(3)

rp) represents the excess return earned for placing wealth at risk.
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Further assumptions are:
(A1)

The capital. markets are frictionless;

(A2)

There are no short selling restrictions or taxes;

(A3)

All market participants are price takers; and

(A4)

Individuals' utility functions are bounded and exhibit nonsatiation and risk aversion.

All of these are fairly standard in asset pricing literature.

Assumption (A3)

implies individuals behave as if their actions do not affect market price.
The first order condition for the maximization of expected utility [see
Mossin (1972)] is,
dUvl dzi

= E{Ui.

[rWi+zi

(X - rp)] (X - rp)} = O,

where E {•} is the expectations operator.

-Z ui

(4)

Formally equation (4) is written,

[rWi + zi (X - rp)] (X- rp) fi (X) dX

= 0,

(5)

where fi (X) is the density function determined by investor i' s beliefs.
In order to illustrate the inadequacy of the traditional efficient/inefficient designation in a sequential information receipt setting, we make an
assumption about the density function in equation (5), fi

(X).

We assume that

investor i believes that the end-of-period value of the risky security is determined as if it were generated by a random process which is well approximated as a normal distribution, i.e.,

In this case the optimal holding of the risky security after the final trading
opportunity (when everyone is informed) is,

- - rpN] I [V 1· , N (X)•R
- 1· , N(Y)],
zi* , N = [Ei , N(X)
where

(6)

Ri,N(Y).::~·E{ut cYi)} I E{Ui (Y)}, the investor's risk aversion

coefficient, and the subscript N denotes the final trading round values.
assertion is proven in the Appendix.

This

15

Our distributional assumption allows us to find closed form expressions for
the investors' portfolio positions [equation (6)] and final equilibrium price.
To write final market price, PN, we make use of the equilibrium clearing
condition,

*

N

L

zi ,N

i=i

(7)

= 1.

Substituting for z* from equation (6) into equation (7) and solving for price
i

yields
N

N

PN = (1/r) ~L. (Ei,N(X)/Ri,N(Y)•Vi,N(X))- 1] / _[L (Ri,N(Yi)"Vi,N(X))
~=~
i=i

-1

(8)

Equation (8) is the price that exists after complete information dissemination.
Our definition of efficiency requires that actual final equilibrium price
equation (8), be identical to the price which would exist if each investor
Suppose we denote this 'efficient-market' price as PN*

received every signal.

and the investor's beliefs and risk aversion upon observing all N signals as

* (X),
- Vi,N
* (X)
- and Ri*,n (Y),
- respectively.
Ei,N

Before the market is effi-

* it must be true that:
cient, i.e., PN = PN,
Ei,N (X) = Ef,N (X); vi,N (X) = vf,NCX); and Ri,N (Y) = Rf,N (Y)
for all investors.12

In addition, this statement must hold true independent

of the order of information dissemination.

We argue below that the market

achieves this efficiency criterion only under very restrictive conditions.
Suppose the information structure is such that the signals generated are
not identical and the equilibrium price is not perfectly invertible 13 on the
information set of the informed.
free of noise.

Individuals receive only one signal (of N)

In general investors' bel~efs, Ei , N(X), V1· , N(X) are not equal

to Ef,N(X) and vf,NCX).
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Suppose, on the other hand, the market structure is such that
(a)

N identical signals are generated (and investors know they are
identical), or,

(b)

that price is perfectly invertible on the information set of
the informed.

Condition (a) or (b) is sufficient to assure investors' beliefs are the same
~

if they receive each signal.

In fact, if condition (a) or (b) holds inves-

tors do have access to all N signals.
In addition to identical beliefs equation (8) requires that Ri,N(Y)
R~
for all investors independent of dissemination order.
l , N(Y·)
l

=

One situation

in which this is true is when investors' utility functions possess constant
absolute risk aversion. 14
wealth.

In this case Ri,N(Yi)

= Ri

for all levels of final

However, if Ri,N(Yi) is not constant in Yi then, even with identical

signals, PN

* PN.*

The inefficiency occurs because end-of-period wealth de-

pends on the individual's order in the information process.

An individual who recognizes his priority position in the receipt of new
data assumes a speculative position which (given reasonable assumptions about
the information gathering process) increases, on average, that trader's wealth
at the expense of his uninformed trading partners [see Jennings and Barry
(1981)].

If we rewrite equation (3) as,15

the relationship between Yi and Wi , N is evident.

Since Wi , N depends on the

order of information receipt, only condition (b) is sufficient to produce an
efficient market.
Condition (b) has problems also.

Grossman and Stiglitz (1975), (1976)

have demonstrated that perfect price invertibility is incompatible with market
efficiency if it is costly to gather information.

Therefore, if information
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acquisition is costly, complete efficiency cannot hold in the market we have
presented.
Even if information is costless, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) and Grossman
and Stiglitz prove that price is perfectly invertible if and only if a oneto-one correspondence exists between the equilibrium price and the information
set, i.e., if there is no noise in the pricing process.

Potential sources of

noise are suggested by Grossman and Stiglitz (supply uncertainty) and Goldman
and Sosin (dissemination uncertainty).

Thus, even if information is costless,

market efficiency would hold only under the very restrictive condition that
prices are fully invertible.16
In this section we developed a traditional definition of efficiency which
is consistent with gradual information dissemination.

With this definition,

price must be perfectly invertible on the information set of the informed before the market is efficient, and perfect invertibility is a highly restrictive condition.

Thus, if we insist on the traditional efficient/inefficient

dichotomy, the concept of market efficiency is uninteresting.
is a measure of the degree of market efficiency.

What is needed

We suggest such a measure in

the following section.
5.

A measure of market inefficiency
The basic concept of information efficiency is that price adjusts quickly

and completely to new data relevant to an asset's value.

Existing research

concentrates on the amount of price adjustment, ignoring the amount of time
required for this adjustment to occur.

We develop a measure of inefficiency

which considers both the price and time dimensions.

Thus, our metric is sen-

sitive to both how much and how rapidly prices adapt to new information.
The previous section revealed two implications of the gradual dissemination of information for the concept of market efficiency.

First we must be
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sure our measure of inefficiency recognizes the ex ante stochastic nature of
final market price.

Each sequence of informatiop receipt by investors may

produce a unique value

fo~

PN.

Therefore, prior to the complete dissemination

of the new data, final market price is a random variable, PN.
We also found that ex ante there is no reason to believe final equilib-

*
rium price converges to the 'efficient-market' price, PN•

Given certain as-

sumptions regarding investor behavior and the investors' information gathering
system, Jennings ( 1981) shows, on average, final equilibrium price is 'correct', i.e., E(PN)=P~, but that PN

= P;

with probability zero.

To be useful

in a gradual information dissemination environment, any measure of ineffic:iency we propose must compare the relative efficiency of different pricing processes which converge at different rates to different final equilibrium
prices, none of which is the 'efficient-market' price.
Figure 1 represents a hypothetical price adjustment path through time.
Price adjusts from an initial stable equilibrium price existing prior to the
release of the information, Po, to a final stable equilibrium price when
everyone is informed, PN, over the time interval 0 TN :::tN -to•

In our nota-

tion, Pi is the equilibrium price which exists after individual i becomes informed and ti is the time at which that investor receives the new data.
0

<i <N

the point (Pi,ti) represents a temporary equilibrium.

If

The news be-

comes available at to, but the first investor does not become informed un til

In order to demonstrate our proposed measure of inefficiency (MI) we

*
initially examine price adjustment paths which converge to PN•

This assump-

tion is later relaxed with only minor modifi cations in the concept of our
me tric.

19
Figure 2 illustrates alternative price adjustment paths which represent:
(A) smooth and rapid convergence towards PN, and; (B) irregular and slow convergence to the same final price.

(In drawing Figure 2 we have assumed the

number of investors is large so that the step-function of price path of Figure
1 may be approximated by a continuous curve.)
a more efficient price adjustment process.

We believe curve 'A' represents

Process 'A' is 'close to' the new

equilibirium price throughout most of the adjustment period and converges monotonically to PN.

Curve 'B', on the other hand, remains 'far from' PN during

most of the adjustment process and wanders about

~omewhat

randomly.

In order

to objectively gauge the relative efficiency of various price adjustment processes, however, we must develop a rigorous measure of 'close to' and 'far
from' as a function of time.
The most extreme concept of efficiency is one in which market price instantaneously changes to the new equilibrium level as soon as the information
becomes available.
to PN*

= PN

In .our model this implies the market price moves from Po

at time to (when the first investor becomes informed) and that this

price remains constant as each trader becomes informed, i.e., P1

= P2 = ••• =

PN and to

= t1•

process.

This extreme form of efficiency occurs if the investor first in the

Figure 3 represents this 'most efficient' price adjustment

know faces so little uncertainty about future price that he assumes a speculative position large enough to force price to the new level or if the actions
of the first informed investor tip-off the uninformed and they infer the new
data from his actions.
against which

~e

We use this 'most efficient' case as the standard

measure the relative efficiency of other price adjustment

paths.
Figure 4 uses a hypothetical price adjustment path to illustrate the intuition behind our MI.

The 'most efficient' price adjustment path is
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represented by the line segments connecting point (Po, to), (PN, to) and (PN,
tN).

Our hypothesized price adjustment path is the curve between (Po, to) and

(PN, tN).

The shaded area represents the inefficiency of the actual price

path relative to the 'most efficient' price path.
MI =

Formally,

t

JN I PN- p(t)ldt,

(10)

to

where p(t) is the actual price at time t.

Our measure is sensitive to:

(1)

the differences in the price with only a subset of the market informed, p(t),
and the price with everyone informed, PN, and; (2) the length of time these
price deviations persist.
Our measure of inefficiency possesses the properties which Goldman and
Sosin (1979, p.32) consider important:
(P 1)

Symmetry - equal absolute deviations of actual market price

from the efficient market price should cause equal measures of inefficiency,
(P2)

Monotonicity - a larger absolute deviation from the efficient

market price should cause a larger measure of inefficiency,
(P3)

Normalization - a zero deviation should imply a zero measure

of inefficiency,
(P4)

Convexity - a doubling of the absolute deviation should at

least (in our case, exactly) double the measure of inefficiency, and,
(PS)

Computational convenience - any measure of inefficiency should

be straightforward to calculate.
In addition, our MI extends properties (P2), (P3) and (P4) to the time
dimension as well as the price dimension.

That is, a price adjustment process

which suffers the same price deviation for timeT' >Twill be more inefficient.
Another i mport ant property is :
(P6)

Insensitivity to units of measurement - changing the units of
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measurement for either the price or time dimensions should not affect the
relative measure of inefficiency.
Both the Goldman and Sosin measure (for the price dimension) and our MI
possess this property.
In the above analysis we take PN as given independently of the
information dissemination process.

The fourth section demonstrated that, in

* the final equilibrium price that
general, PN is typically not equal to PN,
would exist if each investor received every signal.

Extending our analysis to

consider this additional factor does not alter the intuition behind our MI.
Figure 5 depicts the situation in which there is a permanent divergence

*
between PN and PN.

Panel Sa illustrates the case where PN undershoots the

efficient market price and panel Sb represents the case where the final equi-

*
librium price overshoots PN.

In either case the intuition behind our measure

of inefficiency is captured in the formal definition,
~
* p(t)l dt.
MI =t!IPN0

(11)

In equation (11) we change the upper limit of integration to reflect the fact
that without another information event (or some other reason to induce trading) any divergence between the market price and PN* at time tN persists indefinitely.
There are two problems with the measure of inefficiency defined by
equation (11).
path in which PN

First, it provides an indefinite MI for any price adjustment

* PN•*

This implies we are unable to compare the relative

efficiency of two non-converging price adjustment paths.
The second problem is more subtle.

The reallocation of wealth which oc-

curs due to an investor possessing an information priority depends on exactly
when the investor becomes informed.

An investor receiving the news at time t 0

earns a return on his information gathering activity for the entire period.
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The investor informed partially through the dissemination process has a shorter time period over which to earn his information priority return.

(11) ignores this reallocation process.

Equation

We suggest a solution to these prob-

lems in the analysis later in this section.
While equation (11) does not allow u_s to compare the efficiency of any
two arbitrary price adjustment paths, it does permit us to make some dominance
arguments.

Using the dominance idea we are able to judge the relative effi-

ciency of select examples.
First, we find that •a price adjustment process that converges to PN* is
always more efficient than a process which does not converge.

If price ad-

justment process A converges and process B does not then,

=

t£1p~-

t

PB(t)ldt

> JNIP~to

PA(t)ldt.

It may be, however, that for any finite time period, say tf
t
t
tJfiP~ - PB(t) I dt < f~IP~- PA(t)ldt,

> to,

we have

0

i.e., B is more efficient than A.

Thus traditional definitions of market ef-

ficiency which require equivalence between the equilibrium price and some
efficient-market price are correct only in the limit.

In the short run a non-

converging price adjustment path may be preferred to one which converges.
Figure 6 illustrates this concept.
We may also use a dominance argument to judge the relative efficiency of
two non-converging price adjustment paths under certain conditions.

In Figure

7 price adjustment path A dominates (in efficiency) path B since PA(t) is
everywhere closer to PN* than PB(t).

We are unable to judge, however, the rel-

ative efficiency of two non-converging price adjustment paths which intersect
at any time t

>

to with the concept represented by equation (11).

In order to

extend our analysis to any arbitrary information dissemination processes we
must modify our MI.
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Specifically we must alter the definition of our MI to assure a finite
integral and to consider the timing of pricing deviations.

One method which

overcomes both of these problems is to examine the present value of price
deviations per unit time, i.e.,

where P is an appropriate discount rate.

With equation (12) those deviations

occurring far in the future receive little (in the limit zero) weight.

While

(12) resolves the problem that MI might not be comparable over arbitrarily
large time intervals, it demands a rational choice of the discount rate

p.

One could argue that to the extent that p(t) differs from PN* there is an aggregate misallocation of wealth that is linear in lPN* -p(t)l.

The misallo-

cated wealth could be invested in the riskless asset, at least, so that the
risk! ess rate of return could be justified in equation (12).

Ultimately the

choice of an "appropriate" P depends on societal values regarding the choice
between inefficiency today versus inefficiency tomorrow.
We have, in equation (12), developed a measure of inefficiency that considers several important factors in determining the relative efficiency of a
securities market.

Our MI introduces the time dimension into the efficiency

concept and handles its implications.

In the following section we examine

some of the economic variables which influence a market's relative efficiency
as measured by (12).
6.

Economic variable influencing market efficiency.
In the previous section we developed our measure of market inefficiency.

This section investigates some of the economic variables affecting the degree
of efficiency.

If the market is unbiased in its estimate of the impact of new
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data, relative efficiency is determined by the rapidity of price adjustment.
The speed at which prices adapt to the gradual dissemination of additional information is examined in Jennings and Barry (1981).

Much of what we have to

say here is contained in that paper in more detail.
The rapidity of price adjustment at any point in time is graphically portrayed by the slope of the price adjustment curve.
the adaptation of the price to the data is 'rapid'.

If the slope is 'large'
We can divide the eco-

nomic factors determining the shape of the price adjustment curve into market
characteristics and individual investor attributes.
Individuals perceiving that they possess priority in the receipt of information speculate. 11

The rapidity of price adjustment depends, in part, on

the amount of speculative behavior.

Significant speculation by the informed

investors leads to rapid price adjustment.

The size of the speculative posi-

tion assumed by those traders in-the-know depends on their perceived ability
to forecast future price.
forecasting ability.

Many economic variables determine an investor's

Some of these variables are the type of signal, inves-

tors' knowledge about the economic attributes of his peers, the perceived reliability of the new data, the degree of dissemination uncertainty and the individual's perceived social weight in the pricing process.

A factor not di-

rectly affecting the speculative activity of an investor but which affects
portfolio positions (and, therefore, equilibrium price) is the information
content of the signal for both the investor receiving the data and those traders who must infer the news from observing the price reaction.
Investors with an informational advantage are better off if the signal
generating process produces identical signals for each trader.

With identical

signals the informed market participant can more accurately estimate the impact of the signal on other traders who subsequently receive the signal.

This

------ ~~ -----~-~
------------------------

~
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knowlege permits the informed investor to improve his estimate of future
price.
The level of knowledge possessed by an investor about the economic characteristics of his fellow traders also influences the size of the speculative
positions taken.

A trader with considerable knowledge concerning the current

beliefs, risk aversion and the information gathering process of his trading
partners assumes a larger speculative position than an individual without such
knowledge.
The impact of additional information on an investor's beliefs depends on
the perceived accuracy (precision) of the new data.

If the additional infor-

1

mation is perceived as possessing high (low) precision the investor assumes a
large (small) speculative position.
An investor with a good idea of where he stands in the information dis-

semination process can clearly assume a larger speculative position than if he
is unsure about his priority.

If an investor believes that he may enjoy an

informational advantage over no one he can ill-afford to speculate since he
may be unable to rid himself of his extreme portfolio without suffering a
loss.
In Jennings and Barry (1981) we show that the perceived social weight of
an individual in the process determining future prices is important in deciding the speculative activity of the investor.

Those investors who believe

they are relatively important in setting price assume large speculative positions, while those who believe they are less crucial to the process are content with less speculation.

This social weight is measured by the investor's

subjective estimate of the correlation of his belief about future market price
with the future price.

The larger the absolute value of this correlation co-

efficient, the larger the speculation and the more rapid the price adjustment.
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A signal with substantial information content for the recipient is one
which contains information 'different' from the prior beliefs.

For example

consider the case in which individuals are Bayesian in their use of new data,
the random process of concern is normally distributed with unknown mean

~

and known variance, and the new information can be thought of a sample from a
normal process with the same unknown mean and a known sampling variance.
observed
about

~

samp~e

An

mean differing greatly from the individual's prior belief

causes significant revision of that prior.

If the sample mean is

equal to the prior belief the investor's posterior expectation about the unknown mean is identical to the prior.

Thus a signal with significant informa-

tion content causes more rapid price adjustment.
One of the most important factors in determining the rapidity of price
adjustment is the ability of an investor not receiving the exogenous signal to
learn from price adjusts more rapidly than a market ignoring the information
content of equilibrium price.
sponds to each signal.

In a sphoisticated market every individual re-

Thus, the receipt of a signal favorable (unfavorable)

to fUture asset value by any investor tends to cause an increase (decrease) in
demand for every investor.

On the other hand, in a naive setting only the re-

cipient of the signal alters his demand curve.
All of these factors are important in determining the shape of the price
adjustment curve.

Factors favorable to more rapid price adjustment tend to

make the actual price path look like the 'most efficient' price adjustment
path.
7.

Summary and empirical implications.
In this paper we extend the theoretical examination of market efficiency

to a market structure in which information is disseminated gradually to the
investors.

We demonstrate that the traditional definition of market
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efficiency as the equivalence between equilibrium price and an 'efficientmarket price' is not useful in this more general market setting.

In place of

the traditional efficient/inefficient dichotomy we developed a measure of relative efficiency.

Our measure of inefficiency considers both the price and

the time dimension in the price adjustment process.

Specifically our MI is

the present value of the deviations in the actual price adjustment path from
the 'most efficient' price adjustment path per unit time.

Formally this is,

* p(t)ldt,
MI =t j e -pt I PN0

where to is the time at which the information becomes available,
P is an appropriate discount rate,
P~ is the final equilibrium price which would exist if every investor
received each signal.

and
p(t) is the actual market price at time t.
This measure is sensitive to both how much and how quickly prices adjust to
new data.

Finally we discuss economic factors, both individual investor at-

tributes and market characteristics, which influence the relative efficiency
of a market place.
The next step in the process of learning more about the concept of efficiency is to attempt to use some of the concepts of this paper in empirical
efficiency tests.

One obvious drawback is that to calculate our MI you must

know the equilibrium price that would exist with complete dissemination of all

*
data, PN.

Patell and Wolfson (1979) and Hillmer and Yu (1979) provide empiri-

cal techniques which estimate the point at which a market reaches a new equilibrium.

Empirical research may be able to assume that PN is an unbiased es-

timator of PN* or that signals are identical for certain information events
which may allow us to estimate the relative efficiency of the market's reaction to various information events.

28

FOOTNOTES
1.

The unmodified use of the term "efficient" in this paper refers to information (as opposed to economic) efficiency.

2.

Despite the conclusions of Stiglitz (1981), many economists consider the
competitiveness of the financial market to be linked to the economic
efficiency of the economy as a whole.

3.

See Fama (1970) for a metaphorical description of "the market."

4.

Thus the name action efficiency.
takes no portfolio action.

S.

See Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) for a formal derivation of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the uninformed to learn the information set
of the informed from equilibrium price.

6.

The efficiency concept introduced in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) appears to be the first definition allowing a price adjustment following
the public announcement of information. We further demonstrate the inappropriateness of a strict price equivalency by introducing sequential information dissemination.

7.

The investor first receiving the new information has a competitive advantage from being first in the know. Jennings and Barry (1981) demonstrate this advantage.

8.

Patel! and Wolfson (1979) and Hilmer and Yu (1979) offer empirical evidence that the reaction of investors to an information event is indeed
sequential.

9.

Allowing for the possibility that investors choose to remain uninformed
then investors are informed one at a time until all who wish to be informed are informed.

If the market is efficient the investor

I

10.

Typically it is assumed that endowments of the various assets are random.
In this market setting we could also allow non-information related
trades, i.e., trades due to consumption, shifting, preferences or liquidity. Either approach would add the required noise to the price system.

11.

Thus we take the consumption and information expenditures as given.

12.

We dismiss as unlikely the possibility of exactly offsetting differences
in Ei,N(X), Vi,N(X) and Ri,N(Yi) from their appropriate values such that
PN = P~.

13.

I n the Grossman and St i glitz and Ki hl strom and Mirman s e ns e.

14.

See Pratt (1964).
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15.

We are ignoring the (assumed) minor real time it takes for information to
be disseminated in the market place. If an investor's planning horizon
is one year and the information is fully disseminated within a day or two
then, multiplying WiN and PN by the annual riskless rate of return, r,
'
is clearly an approximation.
For illustrative purposes we believe it is
close enough.

16.

Barry (1979) has argued that the information requirements for fully invertible prices in the Kihlstrom-Mirmen market are extreme.

17.

Speculative behavior is defined as an individual assuming a portfolio
position he would not hold if there were not other trading opportunities
prior to the distribution of final wealth.
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